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CANCER AS A PROTECTED HANDICAP IN ILLINOIS
LYONS V. HERITAGE HOUSE RESTAURANTS, INC.
89 Ill 2d 163, 432 N.E 2d 270 (1982)
KENNETH J. GALVIN*
Section 19 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution guarantees to persons
with a physical or mental handicap' freedom from discrimination in
the sale or rental of property and freedom from discrimination unre-
lated to ability in the hiring or promotion practices of any employer. 2
Section 19 does not define "handicap." A subsequent Illinois law, the
Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act (EOHA) 3 defined handi-
cap in a somewhat circuitous manner as follows: The term "physical or
mental handicap" means a handicap unrelated to one's ability to per-
form jobs or positions available to him for hire or promotion or a
handicap unrelated to one's ability to acquire, rent or maintain prop-
erty.4 Lacking a definition of handicap in the Constitution and given
the vagueness of the definition included in the EOHA, "the (Illinois)
appellate courts have devised and applied their own definitions based
on analogies to other Illinois statutes and administrative rules, Federal
law and the law of other States"5 in order to determine exactly which
encumbrance or disability is a covered handicap in this state.
In Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc.,6 plaintiff Elaine Ly-
• B.S., Southern Illinois University, 1973; M.B.A., Southern Illinois University, 1974; Can-
didate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1985.
1. The word "handicap" is thought to derive from the phrase "hand i cap" or "hand in the
cap" which is the name of a sport played in seventeenth century England. One challenger would
offer something of his own in exchange for an article belonging to another. An umpire deter-
mined how much boot would be given in the exchange, and the parties held the forfeit money in
their hands in a cap pending the umpire's decision. In the eighteenth century, the procedures of
this sport were applied to the process of an umpire determining the extra weight to be carried by
the superior horse in a horse race. This idea of "handicapping" the superior competitor was grad-
ually applied to other sports, and since about 1850, the word "handicap" has been applied to any
encumbrance or disability that weighs upon effort and makes success more difficult. See R. L.
BURGDORF, JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS (1980).
2. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19 states: "All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be
free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property and shall be free from discrimination
unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer."
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, 1-101-9-102 (1983).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, 1-103(I) (1983).
5. Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 163, 166, 432 N.E.2d 270, 272
(1982).
6. Id. at 163, 432 N.E.2d at 270.
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ons was dismissed from her job as kitchen manager for the defendant
in July of 1978. One month prior to this dismissal, Lyons and her doc-
tor had notified Heritage House that Lyons had been diagnosed as hav-
ing cancer of the uterus.7 Lyons brought suit under the Illinois
Constitution and the EOHA for loss of her salary, life and health insur-
ance benefits and use of the company car alleging that she was dis-
missed because her employer had learned of her cancer and that her
discharge was a discriminatory action based on her employer's percep-
tion of her as "handicapped." The Illinois Supreme Court held that
cancer was not a handicap within the meaning of the Constitution or
the Act.8
The supreme court failed to see that a distinction cannot be main-
tained between a "real" and a "perceived" handicap. 9 The essence of
Lyon's complaint was not that she was discriminated against because
she was handicapped, but that she was discriminated against because
she was perceived to be handicapped. Since ultimately the discrimina-
tory effects on a person with a "real" or a "perceived" handicap are the
same, Lyons argued that the protection accorded each should also be
the same. The court rejected this argument.
This case comment focuses on the question of whether cancer of
the uterus and, by implication, all forms of cancer, should be consid-
ered a "handicap" within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution and
statutes. In answering this question it is also necessary to consider
whether the constitution and the statutes were designed to protect a
person with cancer who may not be considered handicapped by objec-
tive standards but who is nonetheless perceived by his employer to be
handicapped. It is recommended that in order to effect the purpose of
typical discrimination statutes-"to guarantee freedom from discrimi-
nation in hiring and promotion practices of any employer"-persons
7. The cause of cancer arising in the uterus is unknown but the associated factors include
obesity, diabetes mellitus and childlessness. The tumor grows locally with gradual invasion of the
muscular walls of the uterus and ultimately the cancer may spread to other areas of the body by
way of the blood stream. The average age at which cancer of the uterus is diagnosed is about 55
years, and the chief presenting system is post-menopausal bleeding. The agreed-on definitive
therapy is total hysterectomy and removal of fallopian tubes; this operation is sometimes preceded
by the application of radium within the uterus or the administration of other forms of irradiation
to the pelvis. Many studies report a 10-year survival figure for women with cancer of the uterus.
See 4B R. N. GRAY M.D., THE ATTORNEYS TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, Ch. 290.95.
8. 89 Ill. 2d at 171, 432 N.E.2d at 274.
9. See Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped- A Legal Perspective, 27 DE PAUL L.
REv. 953 (1978) for a discussion of real and perceived handicaps. Gittler notes that whether the
individual is actually handicapped or perceived to be handicapped, the same stereotypes are oper-
ative. "To condone one situation but not the other creates an inherent contradiction." Id. at 984.
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with a "real" handicap and persons "perceived" to be handicapped
must be accorded the same protection.
Historical Background
Section 19 of the Illinois Constitution, which protects handicapped
persons from job discrimination, was adopted in 1970; at that time, no
other state had a comparable provision.' 0 At the constitutional conven-
tion, delegate Richard M. Daley, one of the sponsors of section 19, re-
sponded on inquiry about his definition of physical handicap: "Well, I
would say polio victim, loss of one arm, a leg, finger, one eye-things
like this."" There also exists in the record of the proceedings of the
convention a few references to other disabilities-speech defects, epi-
lepsy, shortness, hemophilia and infantile paralysis.' 2
There is evidence that some delegates to the convention consid-
ered the meaning of "handicap" to be more extensive than disabilities
associated with an arm, a leg or an eye. Delegate Joan Anderson noted
that with regard to employment situations, individuals may have
handicaps of two distinctly different origins.' 3 The first type of handi-
cap is due to the individual's physical, mental, emotional, educational
and social makeup. The other is imposed by society through lack of
understanding and information. "Of the two kinds of handicap," An-
derson remarked, "that imposed on the individual by society is in most
cases more disabling and fundamentally crippling than that which
arises out of the individual's makeup."'' 4
Background information relating to the Illinois legislature's per-
ception of the word "handicapped" in the EOHA is nonexistent. 15
However the purpose of the EOHA and the Fair Employment Practices
Act of Illinois is identical. 16 The Fair Employment Practices Commis-
10. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1970). Most states have now enacted laws covering discrimina-
tion against handicapped individuals. For a listing of federal and state laws and the scope of their
coverage, See The Law And Disabled People, Selected State and Federal Laws Affecting Employ-
ment and Certain Rights ofPeople With Disabilities, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
11. 5 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3679 (1970).
12. These comments were not made in reference to the question of what was meant by
"handicap," "although the context in which they were made supports an inference that the dele-
gates considered these classes of disabilities to be covered by" Section 19. Advocates For The
Handicapped v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 67 IU. App. 3d 512, 515, 385 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
13. 5 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3681 (1970).
14. Delegate Anderson was reading from "a couple of things" sent by the Illinois Governor's
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped titled The Problem of Imposed Handicap. Id at
3681.
15. Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc., 89 IU. 2d 163, 166, 432 N.E.2d 270, 272
(1982).
16. The difference between the Acts is that the EOHA created a private cause of action for
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sion Guidelines relating to the definition of handicap state that a hand-
icapped individual is one who has a physical or mental handicap, as
defined in the Guidelines, or has a record of such a handicap.' 7 The
phrase, "has a record of such a handicap" was included because it was
recognized that the attitudes of employers toward a previous impair-
ment may result in an individual experiencing difficulty in securing,
retaining or advancing in employment. '8 "The mentally restored, those
who have had heart attacks or cancer often experience such
difficulty."19
Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,20 the
controlling case in Illinois with regard to the definition of "handicap,"
was relied upon extensively by the Lyons court. The plaintiff in Advo-
cates, Dennis Klapacz, had nephritis2' for ten years before he applied
for employment at Sears. The plaintiff had undergone a kidney trans-
plant, and when he applied for work, he was qualified to do everything
but heavy lifting. He was turned down for employment by Sears be-
cause he was "an uninsurable risk under Sears' self-insurance pro-
gram.''22 The Advocates court held that the plaintiff did not have a
protected handicap within the meaning of the constitution or the
EOHA. 23
Because the legislature had failed to provide a specific definition of
"handicap" in the statutes, the Advocates court felt obliged to look to
the ordinary and popular definition of the term in order to determine if
individual citizens (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 65-29 (1977)) while the Fair Employment Practices
Act (FEPA) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 858-867 (1977)) set up an administrative mechanism to
process unfair employment practices. Since the statutes are identical in purpose it is proper to
construe one statute by reference to the other for purposes of ascertaining legislative intent. Pet-
terson v. City of Naperville, 9 I11. 2d 233, 133 N.E.2d 371 (1956). After the events in the Lyons
case took place, the EOHA and the FEPA were repealed and incorporated into the Illinois
Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 -9-102 (1983). For a discussion of the Illinois
Human Rights Act and its potential impact on the question of "perceived" handicap, see infra text
accompanying notes 106-11i.
17. FEPC GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, art. III, § 3.2 (1976).
18. Id. at § 3.2 (E).
19. Id.
20. 67 I11. App. 3d 512, 513, 385 N.E.2d 39, 41 (1978), cert. denied 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
"Advocates" is a not-for-profit corporation, established for the purpose of promoting "the com-
mon needs of the handicapped through advocacy, public education and coordination of effort."
The organization is composed of handicapped individuals, parents of handicapped individuals
and professionals involved in the rehabilitation of handicapped people. Id at 513, 385 N.E.2d at
41. The plaintiff, Dennis Klapacz, was a member of the organization.
21. Nephritis is an infiamation of the kidney or a deterioration of the tissue forming its deli-
cate structure. The inflammation may be caused by bacteria, poisons, alcohol, etc. 2 Schmidt
ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, 1983.
22. 67 I11. App. 3d at 513, 385 N.E.2d at 41 (1978).
23. Id at 518, 385 N.E.2d at 44.
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the plaintiff was indeed handicapped. 24 Underlying this obligation,
however, was the court's belief that the legislature had in mind "objec-
tive criteria" for determining what physical or mental conditions con-
stitute handicaps.25  The Advocates court believed that without
"objective criteria" to judge what is and what is not a handicap, the
EOHA would be transformed into a "universal discrimination law."'26
To prevent this potential transformation, the Advocates court suggested
the following as its first definition of handicap: "a class of physical and
mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barri-
ers upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions. 27
The plaintiff in Advocates argued that the ordinary and popularly
understood meaning of the word "handicapped" should be taken from
its dictionary definition: ". . a disadvantage that makes achievement
unusually difficult; esp: a physical disability that limits the capacity to
work. ' 28 In light of this definition, the plaintiff argued that Sears' de-
nial of employment fulfilled the requirement of the definition that the
physical condition "makes achievement unusually difficult" since
achievement is difficult if a person is unable to get a job. The plaintiff
also argued that the phrase "limits the capacity to work" means simply
that an employer has acted upon a physical condition and denied em-
ployment to an individual, another requirement which Sears fulfilled.
The Advocates court appeared to agree with the dictionary defini-
tion of the word "handicap" and the court recognized that this defini-
tion had been relied upon by the Wisconsin courts in resolving issues
similar to the ones then before the Advocates court.29 However, the
Advocates court believed that the plaintiffs suggested interpretation of
the definition was too broad, and the court chose to interpret the defini-
tion from the perspective of the plaintiffs ability to work rather than
from the perspective of his ability to find work: ". . the phrases [in
the definition] 'limit the capacity to work' and 'makes achievement un-
usually difficult' more properly refer to an individual's ability to per-
form job-related tasks and not to the fact that he has been denied
employment." 30 In light of this interpretation, the Advocates court sug-
24. Id. at 515, 385 N.E.2d at 42.
25. Id. at 516, 385 N.E.2d at 43.
26. Id.
27. Id. Implied here is that by judging every disability in light of its effect on an individual's
"major life functions," the courts would have objective criteria for determining what is a
handicap.
28. WEBSTER, THIR.D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976).
29. 67 Il. App. 3d at 516, 385 N.E.2d at 43 (1978).
30. Id. at 517, 385 N.E.2d at 43.
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gested a second definition of handicap: "the disability is one which is
generally perceived as one which severely limits the individual in per-
forming work-related functions."' 3' Because the plaintiff's nephritis did
not prevent him from performing work-related functions, he was not
handicapped, according to the court.32
The Advocates approach was utilized in Kubik v. CNA Financial
Corp.3 3 In Kubik, the plaintiff alleged that he had a malignant tumor
on his colon which was successfully removed, and that doctors would
not consider him cured until five years had passed without a recur-
rence. The plaintiff stated that he was "physically handicapped in that
his physiological condition limited and is regarded as limiting certain
of his major life functions. ' 34 The plaintiff had worked for CNA for a
number of years, and when he returned to work after the tumor was
removed, his employment was terminated.
The court in Kubik held that the plaintiffs condition did not come
within the class of physical conditions which are generally believed to
impose severe barriers upon the ability of the individual to perform
major life functions, and thus did not constitute a handicap. 35 Relying
on the dictionary definition of "handicap" used in Advocates, the Kubik
court noted that there was nothing in the record from which it could be
inferred that the plaintiffs condition was "a disadvantage that makes
achievement unusually difficult" or "a physical disability which limits
the capacity to work. '36
The Advocates approach to defining "handicap" followed by the
Illinois courts had not been followed by the state of Wisconsin which
also had a discrimination statute that did not contain a definition of
"handicapped." 37 The Advocates court was aware that its interpreta-
31. Id. Again implied here, is that by judging every disability in light of its effect on the
performance of "work-related functions," the court would have objective criteria for determining
what is a handicap.
32. Id. at 518, 385 N.E.2d at 44.
33. 96 Inl. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981).
34. Id. at 716, 422 N.E.2d at 3.
35. Id. at 719, 422 N.E.2d at 4.
36. Id.
37. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (1984) which states: Subject to §§ 111.33-111.36, no employer,
labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person may engage in any act
of employment discrimination as specified in § 111.322 against any individual on the basis of age,
race, creed, color, handicap, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record or convic-
tion record. In 1984, the statute was amended to include a definition of "handicapped": A handi-
capped individual is defined to mean "an individual who: (a) [ias a physical or mental
impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work; (b) [h]as a
record of such an impairment; or (c) [ils perceived as having such an impairment. WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 111.32(8) (1984). This definition codified Wisconsin case law as found in Chicago, Mil-
waukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company v. Wisconsin, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443
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tion of handicapped placed it in conflict with the reasoning of the Wis-
consin courts. 38 However, the Advocates court believed that Wisconsin
had adopted the approach suggested by the plaintiff in Advocates.39 In
the decisions in Wisconsin concerning what is and what is not a handi-
cap, the courts have gotten away from the "objective criteria" interpre-
tation followed by Advocates and have utilized instead the concept of a
"perceived handicap." An understanding of this concept is necessary
for a thorough understanding of the Lyons decision and, accordingly, a
short discussion of the Wisconsin cases follows.
In Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company v.
Dep't of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,40 the railroad appealed
a lower court decision to reinstate an employee who was fired because
of his asthma. The employee had been hired as a common laborer in
the railroad's diesel house. Prior to beginning work, the employee re-
vealed to the company doctor during the course of a physical examina-
tion that he had a prior history of asthma. Two weeks after starting
work, the employee was dismissed although his work had been done to
the satisfaction of his foreman. 41
The court in Chicago Milwaukee held that "handicap" as used in
the Wisconsin statute must be defined as including such diseases as
asthma which make achievement "unusually difficult."' 42 In so doing,
the court relied on the same dictionary definition of "handicap" used in
Advocates. Additionally, the court noted that the Wisconsin statute re-
stricted the employer's right to discriminate against those individuals
who, though handicapped, could function efficiently on the job.43 The
court added that if a handicapped individual could function efficiently
on the job, the mere fact that he was different from the average em-
ployee could "not be used as a basis for discrimination." 44
(1974) and Dairy Equipment Company v. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 95 Wis.
2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980). See Rice, The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act and the 1982
Amendments, WISCONSIN BAR BULLETIN, August, 1982, page 17.
38. 67 Ill. App. 3d at 517, 385 N.E.2d at 43 (1978).
39. Id. at 518, 385 N.E.2d at 44.
40. 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
41. Id. at 394-95, 215 N.W.2d at 444.
42. Id. at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
43. The court stated:
If an individual were a paraplegic and were able to efficiently perform the duties of the
job, then he would be protected under (the statutes), but if an individual were asthmatic
or suffered from migraine headaches, though able to efficiently perform the duties of the
job, no protection against discrimination would be found under the statute. The legisla-
tive policy of encouraging the employment of allproperly qualified persons would not be
served under such a statutory construction.
Id. at 397, 215 N.W.2d at 445.
44. Id.
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In Chrysler Outboard Motor Co. v. Dep't of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations,45 the Wisconsin Circuit Court held that acute lym-
phocytic leukemia was a handicap within the meaning of Wisconsin's
Fair Employment Act. Chrysler admitted that the company refused to
hire an applicant who had leukemia because he ran a high risk of infec-
tion from normal or minor injury, a risk of prolonged recuperation
from such injuries and a risk of complications from injuries or the dis-
ease itself.46 At no time did Chrysler contend that the applicant was
unable to perform at the standards set by Chrysler.
Relying again on the dictionary definition of "handicapped," the
court in Chrysler noted that if an employee's illness or defect makes it
more difficult for him to find work, then it certainly operates to make
"achievement unusually difficult. ' 47 Chrysler's refusal to hire the ap-
plicant because of his illness was a "classic example of how such an
illness operates as a handicap. '48
The Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to have gone one step fur-
ther than Chrysler in deciding Dairy Equipment Company v. Dep't of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations.49 In Dairy, employee Michael
Wolf was given a pre-employment physical at which time he revealed
that he only had one kidney and that the other one had been surgically
removed some time earlier. Wolf started work and performed satisfac-
torily; three days later his employer received the medical report and
terminated him.5 0 The medical report stated that Wolf "was acceptable
for any kind of work for which he was qualified." 5'
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the employer
should cease and desist discriminating against Wolf. The lower court
ruled that Wolf was handicapped because he had a perceived sensitiv-
ity to injury in the future. The supreme court agreed with this conclu-
sion and added that it would be "ironic" if the legislative intent in
providing the protection of the Fair Employment Act were afforded to
persons who actually have a handicap, but the same protection were
denied to those whom employers perceive as being so handicapped. 52
It is precisely this "irony" which has been overlooked by the Illi-
nois courts in Advocates, Kubik and Lyons. In these three cases, the
45. 14 FEP Cases 344 (1976).
46. Id. at 344.
47. Id. at 345.
48. Id.
49. 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
50. Id. at 321, 290 N.W.2d at 331.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 330, 290 N.W.2d at 335.
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employers have been permitted to refuse to hire or to terminate the
plaintiffs because of their handicaps, and then to argue in the courts
that the same plaintiffs were not handicapped within the Constitution
and the statutes. This anomaly has been permitted because the Illinois
courts have chosen to look at "objective criteria" in determining what
is a handicap rather than at the employer's perception.
Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc.
Facts of the Case
Elaine Lyons was hired by Heritage House Enterprises, Inc. in
1966 in a supervisory capacity. In 1972, Lyons53 became a manage-
ment employee of Heritage House as its kitchen operations supervisor;
her duties included hiring and training kitchen personnel, menu prepa-
ration and general supervision of kitchen activities for eight restaurants
owned by Heritage House. 54
During the summer of 1978, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having
cancer of the uterus. She was advised by her physician that it would be
necessary to undergo five weeks of radiation therapy, together with a
surgical procedure to remove her uterus.55 The radiation was adminis-
tered in July of 1978, and it was scheduled so that the plaintiff would
not be absent from work.56 The plaintiff and her doctor notified Heri-
tage House of the plaintiffs medical condition.57
On July 28, 1978, an officer of Heritage House 58 informed the
plaintiff that she was being removed from the corporate payroll for a
six-month period, that her insurance benefits were being cancelled, and
that the company-owned automobile was being taken from her. The
officer told the plaintiff that her job would not be held open for her
after the six-month period, and that a lesser position could not be guar-
anteed to her.59
The plaintiff alleged that she was dismissed because her employer
had learned of her cancer, and that her discharge was a discriminatory
action based on her physical handicap. She brought suit under the Illi-
nois Constitution and the 1977 EOHA for loss of her salary, life and
53. Hereinafter referred to as plaintiff.
54. Lyons v. Heritage House Enterprises, Inc., 92 I11. App. 3d 668, 669, 415 N.E.2d 1341, 1342
(1981), rev'd, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982).
55. Id.
56. Id There is no indication, in either the appellate opinion or the supreme court opinion,
that the radiation therapy incapacitated the plaintiff in any way.
57. Id.
58. Leonard W. Lambert included as a defendant in the case.
59. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 415 N.E.2d at 1343 (1981).
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health insurance benefits and use of the company car.60 Heritage
House filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs purported
ailment was not a physical handicap.6' The trial court agreed with
Heritage House and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for failure to
state a cause of action;62 the appellate court reversed 63 and the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that cancer was
not a handicap within the meaning of the Constitution or the Act. 64
Reasoning of the Appellate Court
The appellate court in Lyons expressly declined to follow the rul-
ing of Advocates.65 The court noted that according to the second defini-
tion in Advocates, the determination of whether a person is
handicapped depends on whether the character of the disability is one
which is perceived as severely limiting a person in performing work-
related functions. 66 However, under the EOHA, such a fact situation
would not be actionable because the statute expressly applied only to
discriminatory practices which are based on physical conditions unre-
latedto one's ability to perform work-related tasks.67 Similarly, the ap-
pellate court concluded that if a person is not handicapped, he is
precluded from maintaining an action under the statute based on a
handicap that does not exist.68 The court implied here that the only
effective way to argue under the EOHA is to (1) claim a handicap
which is unrelated to the ability to perform one's job or (2) to allege
that the employer perceived the employee to have a handicap which is
unrelated to the ability to perform the job. In the court's opinion, the
plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to allege a "physical condition
which can be equated with a physical handicap" and "the allegations
also support[ed] the conclusion that the defendants considered plain-
tiff's physical condition to be a physical handicap" which controlled
their decision to terminate her employment. 69 It would appear that the
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. This hearing took place in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County.
63. 92 Ill. App. 3d 668, 415 N.E.2d 1341 (1981).
64. 89 I11. 2d 163, 171, 432 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1982).
65. 92 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672, 415 N.E.2d 1341, 1344-45 (1981). The appellate court stated:
"The trial judge did that which he was required to do even though we ultimately reject the prece-
dent which resulted in dismissal of the complaint." Id. at 674, 415 N.E.2d at 1346.
66. Id. at 672, 415 N.E.2d at 1344-45. The Lyons appellate court did not consider Advocates'
"first" definition.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 3 and 4.
68. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 672, 415 N.E.2d at 1345 (1981).
69. Id. Note that the court's use of the word "considered" appears to be synonymous with
general usage of the word "perceived."
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court's holding would fit both (1) and (2) above.
As support for its conclusion, the appellate court relied on the
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 197370 which "specifically includes can-
cer in its list of handicaps."' 7' Additionally, the court noted that the
Fair Employment Practices Commission Guidelines also consider can-
cer to fall within the ambit of handicaps as defined by the statutes.72
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.73 The defendant then appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court.
Reasoning of the Supreme Court
The supreme court in Lyons considered the first definition of
"handicap" set forth in Advocates, a "class of physical and mental con-
ditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the
ability of an individual to perform major life functions" to be a "fair"
one.74 The court based its decision that Lyon's cancer was not a handi-
cap on the above definition.
For assistance in determining what "major life functions" were,
the supreme court relied on Fair Employment Practices Commission
Guidelines 75 and on guidelines promulgated by the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services.76 The Fair Employment
Practices Commission Guidelines define "life activities" to include
communication, self care, socialization, education, employment and
transportation.77 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
defined major life activities to include activities such, "as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning and working."78 According to the court in Lyons,
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982) which states at § 706(12):
The term severe handicap means the disability which requires multiple services over an
extended period of time and results from amputation, blindness, cancer, cerebral palsy,
cystic fibrosis, deafness, heart disease, hemiplegia, mental retardation, mental illness,
multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, neurological disorders (including stroke and epi-
lepsy), paraplegia, quadriplegia and other spinal cord conditions, renal failure, respira-
tory or pulmonary dysfunction, and any other disability specified by the Secretary in
regulations he shall prescribe.
7 1. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with this statement. See infra text accompanying
notes 80-82.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19. The supreme court discounted the appellate
court's interpretation of the FEPA. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
73. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 674, 415 N.E.2d at 1346 (1981).
74. 89 Ill. 2d at 168, 432 N.E.2d at 273 (1982).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 851-867 (1977).
76. 45 C.F.R. 84.3 (Subpart A - General Provisions) (1983).
77. 89 Ill. 2d at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 274 (1982).
78. 45 C.F.R. 84.3 (j)(2)(ii) (1980).
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since "the plaintiff has not alleged that her cancer has substantially hin-
dered her in any of these activities or any other activities or that her
employer perceived her condition as causing such a hindrance," 79 the
plaintiff was not handicapped.
The court in Lyons disagreed with the appellate court's belief that
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "specifically included cancer in its list of
handicaps. ' 80 The Rehabilitation Act, in defining "severe handicap"
includes disabilities which require extra services and which result from
blindness, cancer, cerebral palsy and a variety of other conditions. 8'
The court noted that the Rehabilitation Act "does not call cancer by
itself a handicap. '82
Similarly, the court in Lyons discounted the appellate court's reli-
ance on Fair Employment Practices Commission Guidelines concern-
ing cancer as a handicap:8 3 "[The Guidelines] offhandedly mention
recovered cancer victims as persons who sometimes have experienced
trouble readjusting to employment because of their record of a handi-
cap. Nowhere does the Commission say that cancer victims necessarily
come within the definition of the handicapped. '84 Even if the Rehabil-
itation Act and the Guidelines had included cancer as a handicap, the
court in Lyons noted that it would not be bound by the interpretation
since the Illinois Constitution and the Equal Opportunities for the
Handicapped Act both predate the laws discussed above.8 5
Finally, it must be noted that the supreme court in Lyons did not
extensively consider the second definition of "handicapped" suggested
in Advocates: a disability "which is generally perceived as one which
severely limits the individual in performing work-related functions. '8 6
The court appeared to agree with the appellate court's concept that ac-
cording to the above definition, a person would be handicapped only if
he was unable to perform work-related functions.8 7 However, the court
79. 89 Ill. 2d at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274 (1982). This statement by the supreme court is true
as far as it goes. The plaintiff's complaint was that she was "not limited in doing her work by
reason of her cancer, but the defendants, through lack of understanding or lack of information
considered her to be handicapped and terminated her." Answer Brief of PlaintiffAppellee, No.
54655, Filed September 16, 1981, page 6. Impliedin this complaint is that the plaintiffs employer
perceived her cancer as constituting a hindrance in performing major life activities.
80. 89 I11. 2d at 169-70, 432 N.E.2d at 273.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 706(13) (Supp. II 1981) (emphasis added) See supra note 70.
82. 89 Ill. 2d at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 273 (1982).
83. FEPC GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, art. III, § 3.2 (E) (1976). See
supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
84. 89 Ill. 2d at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 273 (1982).
85. Id
86. 67 II1. App. 3d at 517, 385 N.E.2d at 43 (1978).
87. 92 I11. App. 3d at 672, 415 N.E.2d at 1344 (1981).
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recognized that the above definition "would nullify the force of the law
entirely" because under both the EOHA and the Constitution, handi-
caps that interfere with the applicant's ability to do the job are ex-
pressly exempted.88
Analysis
Objective Criteria. Irrelevant and Misleading
The supreme court in Lyons stated that the plaintiff had not al-
leged that her cancer had substantially hindered her in the performance
of major life functions or that her employer perceived her condition as
causing such a hindrance.89 It appears, however, that the court over-
looked several important factors.
First, the court fails to equate "major life functions" (the first defi-
nition in Advocates) with "work-related functions" (the second defini-
tion in Advocates). If the plaintiff had alleged that one of her major life
functions had been impaired by her cancer but that this impairment
did not affect her ability to perform her job, the court, could conceiva-
bly have found discrimination. However, by arguing the impairment
of a major life function, the plaintiff would be bringing herself very
close to arguing the impairment of a work-related function. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services defined major life func-
tions to include such activities as caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing and speaking.90 If Lyons had
argued that her cancer affected her ability to perform one of the above
activities, Heritage House would have argued that the activity was nec-
essary for satisfactory performance on the job. Both the appellate court
and the supreme court recognized that if the plaintiff had an impair-
ment which affected her ability to do her job, the situation would not
be actionable. 9' What the supreme court did not recognize, however, is
that impairment of any of the "major life activities" or "major life
functions" listed by the court would, most likely, also be an impairment
of a work-related function. 92
Secondly, the appellate court in Lyons effectively concluded that if
88. 89 Ill. 2d at 168, 432 N.E.2d at 272 (1982).
89. Id. at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 274 (1970). See also supra note 79.
90. 45 C.F.R. 84.3 (j)(2)(ii) (1980).
91. 89 Ill. 2d at 168, 432 N.E.2d at 272 (1982). See also 92 Ill. App. 3d at 672, 415 N.E.2d at
1345 (1981).
92. As a particular disability is measured against an increasingly broadened range of func-
tions, the chances increase of finding a function the performance of which the disability will im-
pede. Erf, Potluck Protectionsfor Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need To Amend Title VII To
Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis 0fDisability, 8 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 814, 840 (1977).
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a person is not handicapped, he is precluded from maintaining an ac-
tion 93 based on a handicap which does not exist.94 Because of the diffi-
culty in arguing the impairment of a "major life function" which does
not impair a "work-related function," and because a plaintiff who is
not handicapped is precluded from maintaining an action, it appears
that the most effective way to argue under the Illinois statute is that a
plaintiff has a "perceived handicap." In alleging a "perceived handi-
cap," a plaintiff is, in effect, saying that he is not in fact handicapped
but is considered by his employer to be handicapped. In other words,
the handicap exists only in the employer's perception, but not in sub-
stance. Proof of an employer's perception of an impairment should,
therefore, replace the need to ascertain an actual impairment 95 as was
required by the supreme court in Lyons. When a plaintiff is arguing a
perceived handicap, any consideration by the court of "impairment" of
major life functions would appear to be, at least, irrelevant, and quite
possibly misleading.
The supreme court, in deciding Lyons, has presupposed that a cer-
tain amount of objectivity is inherent in the concept of "handicapped."
It appears, however, that one of the most important elements in decid-
ing who is and who is not handicapped revolves around social consid-
erations: arguably, a person truly qualifies as handicapped only as a
result of being so labeled by others.96 In deciding that the Illinois Con-
93. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 672, 415 N.E.2d at 1345 (1981).
94. Illinois law differs here from the law of other states. See, e.g., Barnes v. Washington
Natural Gas Company, 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461, 462 (1979): "The issue here is narrow:
May a plaintiff claiming not to be handicapped sue under the Act on the grounds that he was
discriminatorily discharged under the erroneous belief he suffered a handicap? We answer in the
affirmative .... "
95. See The Rehabilitation Act of 1973; Who Is Handicapped Under Federal Law, U.S.F.L.
REv. 677 (1982), for a discussion of proof requirements under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for a
handicap that "exists only in the employer's mind." See also Belton, Burdens of Pleading and
Proof In Discrimination Cases Toward a Theory ofProcedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205,
1252 (1981) for a discussion of the "but-for" or "substantial factor" test as a means of showing
causation in discrimination cases. According to Belton, discrimination must, in most cases, be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1254.
96. For an excellent discussion of the result of "labeling" as it affects the determination of
who is handicapped, see Burgdorf, supra note i, § C, "Society as a Creator of Handicap." See also
Burgdorf, M. and Burgdorf Jr. R., 4 History of Unequal Treatment.- The Qualofcations of Handi-
capped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW.
857 (1975):
Moreover, a person whose condition need not be a substantial impediment may become
"handicapped" if he or she is labeled and treated as "handicapped" by members of soci-
ety. Educators and psychologists use the term "self-fulfilling prophecy" to describe a
process whereby persons assigned stigmatizing labels tend to conform to the expectations
created by such labels. This effect may be magnified when, as in the case of handicapped
persons, the label has practical and legal ramifications.
1d. at 858.
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stitution and the EOHA protect only those people who can be consid-
ered to be handicapped by objective standards (such as a consideration
of impairment of "major life functions"), the court has created an in-
herent contradiction. Whether the individual is perceived to be handi-
capped or actually handicapped, the same stereotypes are operative
and the same discrimination will be suffered. 97 To condone one situa-
tion and not the other would seem to result in an unfair and uneven
application of a discrimination statute.
Physical Disability v. Medical Condition
There is one further problem with the supreme court's considera-
tion of impairment of "major life functions" as a means of determining
who is handicapped: Whereas a consideration of impairment of "ma-
jor life functions" might be appropriate for determining whether a
physical disability constitutes a handicap, it does not appear to be ap-
propriate when the courts are confronted with a medical condition such
as cancer. The State of California's experience with its Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act98 illustrates this point. The California statute pro-
hibited discrimination by an employer because of a physical
handicap.99 Physical handicap under the statute "includes impairment
of sight, hearing, or speech . ..or impairment of physical activities
• ..or any other health impairment."' °°
After the initial adoption of the Fair Employment Practices Act,
the California legislature decided that "medical condition" as distin-
guished from "physical handicap" warranted special protection and
amended the Act to forbid discrimination because of "medical condi-
tion." 10 1 "'Medical condition' means any health impairment . ..re-
lated to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has
been rehabilitated or cured."'10 2 In American National Insurance Com-
pany v. State of California Fair Employment Practice Commission,10 3 the
97. Gittler, note 9 supra at 984.
98. CAL. CODE § 12940 (West 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id. at § 12926(h) (West 1980). Note the similarities between the impairments as de-
scribed by California and the impairments of "major life functions" suggested by FEPC Guide-
lines and used by the Illinois court in deciding Lyons.
101. CAL. LAB. CODE, § 12940 (West 1980).
102. CAL. LAB. CODE, § 1413-h (West 1980) as amended by Stats. 1975 c.431, p. 923. Ac-
CORDING TO THE LAW AND DISABLED PEOPLE: SELECTED FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS AFFECT-
ING EMPLOYMENT AND CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980, page 69. California is the only state which mentions "cancer patients" in its
affirmative action and anti-discrimination in employment laws.
103. 114 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 170 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1981).
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plaintiff alleged that he had been dismissed from his job because he
had been diagnosed as having high blood pressure. Because the al-
leged discriminatory action had taken place prior to the amendment of
the California statute to include "medical condition," the plaintiff was
forced to argue that his high blood pressure was a physical handicap. 104
The court held that high blood pressure was not a physical handicap
because it did not impair any bodily functions as required by the stat-
ute. The court remarked that the intent of the legislature was made
clear when "medical condition" was added to the statute: physical
handicap had not been intended to encompass a "medical
condition." 105
It seems reasonable to assume that cancer is more similar to a
"medical condition," such as high blood pressure, than to a physical
handicap. The Advocates definition, however, requires a consideration
of impairment of major life functions whether the handicap is "physi-
cal" or a "medical condition." In light of the California experience, it
appears that a consideration of impairment may be inappropriate when
the courts are attempting to determine whether a "medical condition"
such as cancer is a handicap.
Changes Under the Illinois Human Rights Act
It must be noted here that after the events in the Lyons case oc-
curred, the EOHA and FEPA were replaced by the Illinois Human
Rights Act (IHRA). 1°6 The IHRA defines handicap in the following
manner:
"Handicap" means a determinable physical or mental characteristic
of a person . . . the history of such characteristic, or the perception
of such characteristic by the person complained against, which may
result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional
disorder and which characteristic:
(1). . .is unrelated to the person's ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position.' 7
Although the definition contains a clause concerning "perception," the
104. 170 Cal. Rptr. 887, 890 n.2 (1981).
105. High blood pressure does not fit within the classification indicated by that definition
[of physical handicap]. Each of the conditions listed in the definition is an impairment of
some bodily functions. High blood pressure does not impair function in any way analo-
gous to. . .the impairment of sight, hearing or speech. The closing phrase of the defini-
tion "any other health impairment..." confirms the view that "handicap" refers to an
impairment of function, as distinguished from a medical condition which has a lesser
effect.
170 Cal. Rptr. at 888 (1981).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 -9-102 (1983).
107. Id. at §1-103(I).
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"perception" must be of a "determinable physical characteristic." It
would be difficult to fit cancer into this description since in most cases
cancer is internal and would not result in a "determinable physical
characteristic." If, however, "characteristic" is meant to be interpreted
more broadly as a "quality" or "peculiarity," 0 8 cancer may be covered
under the IHRA as "the history of such characteristic." At this time,
no cases concerning cancer or disease or medical condition have been
tried under the IHRA.
It is interesting to note that the appellate court in Lyons stated that
"it is clear that plaintiff's alleged physical condition would fall within
the definition of handicap as set forth in the IHRA."' 10 9 Alternatively,
the Illinois Bar Journal has commented that the definition of handicap
included in the IHRA appears to be modeled on the interpretation of
handicapped adopted in Advocates. "10 If this is true, and if the supreme
court in Lyons interpreted Advocates correctly, then it would seem evi-
dent that cancer would not be a protected handicap under the IHRA."l
Other Considerations
The courts in Illinois have recognized that in view of the similari-
ties between the Illinois and federal fair employment enactments, the
federal experience can serve as a useful guide in cases involving Illi-
nois' FEPA. 1 2 The courts in Advocates and in Lyons did not exten-
sively use the "federal experience" as a guide and, of course, were not
bound to do so. The federal government's Rehabilitation Act of
108. WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976).
109. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 674, 415 N.E.2d at 1346 (1981).
110. Davis and Murchy, The Illinois Human Rights Act: Revision of Illinois Law Concerning
Discrimination in Employment, 69 ILL. B.J. 218, 224 (1980). But see Risk Oriented Employment
Screening, 59 TEX. L.R. 999, 1055 n. 235 (1981): "The Illinois Legislature apparently agreed with
the plaintiff in Advocates, for it enacted a new Human Rights Act, effective July 1, 1980, which set
forth a definition of handicap similar to that in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ....
Ill. If the Illinois legislature intended a disease such as cancer to be covered under the IHRA,
"handicap" could have been more clearly defined as follows:
Handicap means (1) a determinable physical or mental characteristic of a person, (2) the
history of a physical or mental characteristic or (3) the perception of a physical or mental
characteristic by the person complained against, which may result from disease, injury,
congenital condition of birth or functional disorder and which characteristic: ...is
unrelated to the person's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
Clause (1) above would cover those people who have an actual handicap. Clause (2) would cover
those people who formerly had a handicap but have since recovered. Clause (3) would cover
those people who are not in fact handicapped but are perceived as having a physical or mental
characteristic which constitutes a handicap. Cancer would be covered under clause (3) in this
definition.
112. See, e.g., Schoneberg v. Grundy County Special Education Cooperative & Board of Edu-
cation District No. 54, 67 Ill. App. 3d 899, 385 N.E.2d 351 (1979). See also supra note 16.
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1973,113 which forbids discrimination against the handicapped by any
employer holding a contract with the governent in excess of $2,500,
specifically includes cancer as a handicap" 4 and persons who are
thought of as handicapped although not actually handicapped."15 Al-
though the Lyons court did use the federal definition of "severe handi-
cap" in its analysis," 16 it appears that the court either overlooked or
chose to ignore the federal interpretation.
Other aspects of the problem of handicap discrimination which
warrant consideration are 1) whether an employer may terminate a
"handicapped" employee because of the possibility that his condition
may worsen in time 1 7 and 2) whether an employer may refuse to hire
or retain a "handicapped" employee because of a potential increase in
insurance costs.
With regard to the first consideration above, it would appear that
to the extent that fair employment legislation is generally written in the
present tense, as is Illinois', there should be no room to argue that fu-
ture considerations that do not affect present performance may be al-
lowed to affect the employer's decisions."18 One commentator has
stated that, "it is. . . important that an employer be able to prove the
complainant's inability existed at the time of the adverse employment
decision, and that the employer's decision had nothing to do with either
a past inability or a potential future inability to perform."" 9 Although
the courts appear to lean toward disallowing any consideration by the
113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982).
114. Appendix A to Affirmative Action Regulations on Handicapped Workers, 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-741 (1981) as discussed in THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Ch. 6, § 6.02,
which states:
Any person who has recovered from a previous handicap, such as cancer, heart attack or
mental illness, is also treated as handicapped. This group has been included because the
attitudes of employers, supervisors and co-workers may interfere with their ability to
obtain and retain employment. For similar reasons, persons who are thought of as hand-
icapped although not actually handicapped are covered under the Act.
At this time, no cases concerning cancer have been decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
115. Congress has compared persons who are thought of as handicapped to persons who are
discriminated against because of race although the person is not in fact a member of a minority.
See S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 38, reprinted in (1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6389.
116. 89 Ill. 2d at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 273 (1982).
117. See, e.g., Rogers v. Campbell Foundry Co., 447 A.2d 589 (New Jersey 1982) in which
Campbell Foundry refused to hire the plaintiff because he had a "hilar shadow on his left side."
Id at 590. The company believed that because of the silica dust present in the foundry, persons
with scarring on their lungs would have a significant predisposition to contract silicosis or pneu-
moconiosis on the job. The court agreed with the New Jersey Director of the Division of Civil
Rights that the foundry's decision not to hire Rogers was "unjustifiable." Id at 590.
118. Erf, supra note 92 at 843.
119. Burstein, J. and Foster, T., Handicap Discrimination.- The Available Defenses, 7 EM-
PLOYEE RELATIONS L. J. 672, 677 (1982).
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employer of future aggravation of a medical condition, 120 they have not
been unanimous in this regard. 12' It is also important to recognize that
if aggravation is allowed to enter into an employer's decision, the ques-
tion would then arise as to the degree of medical certainty that would
be required with respect to a prognosis of future degeneration of an
employee's condition. 122
In general, the courts have refused to consider the potential for
increased insurance costs to be a valid reason for refusing to hire or for
terminating employment. In Chrysler Outboard Motor Company v.
Dep't of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,123 Chrysler stated that
the company had made a "sound business decision" in not hiring a
person with leukemia because of the "higher risk of absenteeism and
increased insurance costs." The court replied: "[o]nce again the peti-
tioner [Chrysler] misapprehends the intent of the statute. An em-
ployer's refusal to hire a person solely on the basis of a handicap
operates to discriminate against him regardless of the intent of the em-
ployer."'' 24 In Sterling Transit Co. v. FEPC,125 the employer had justi-
fied its practice of refusing to hire all persons having nondisabling
abnormal backs on the grounds that such practice decreased its risk of
undetermined future increases in the cost of doing business. 26 The
court noted that such practice may be in an employer's economic inter-
est, but "such a blanket exclusion eviscerates the legislative policy by
erecting employment barriers more difficult to scale than Mount
Ranier." 127
The Advocates court recognized one strong public policy argument
when it rejected the plaintiffs broad interpretation of the word "handi-
cap." The court stated that since virtually every consideration upon
which an employer is likely to evaluate a prospective or current em-
ployee may be classified as either a mental or physical condition, the
120. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 13 FEPC 385 (1976) (aggravation may not be
considered).
121. See, e.g., Clark v. Milwaukee Road, 12 FEPC 1102 (1975) (aggravation may be
considered).
122. In Wisconsin, a "reasonable probability" standard has been adopted for proving that job
duties and working conditions would be hazardous to an employee's health in the future. This
standard is in essence a balancing test, weighing the right of a handicapped individual to obtain
gainful employment against the risk of harm to the handicapped individual. For a discussion of
the "reasonable probability" standard, see Rice, The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act and the 1982
Amendments, WISCONSIN BAR BULLETIN 59, August, 1982.
123. 14 FEP Cases 344 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
124. Id. at 345.
125. 28 FEP Cases 1351 (1981).
126. Id. at 1352.
127. Id at 1355.
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Act would be transformed into a universal discrimination law. 128
While this argument has some merit, it must be balanced against the
intent of the legislature in enacting any discrimination statute. If the
legislature intended that a certain class of persons be protected against
discrimination, it is the responsibility of the courts to ensure this pro-
tection, regardless of how "universal" the protected class may be. It is
of little comfort to a person perceived to be handicapped that his or her
employer's perception is erroneous. To such a person, the employer's
perception is as important as reality. It should be apparent to the
courts that the "perception" and the "reality" warrant the same
protection.
Conclusion
Cancer is not a protected handicap in the State of Illinois. The
Lyons court, and the Advocates court before it, failed to recognize that
the intent of the legislature in guaranteeing freedom from discrimina-
tion to handicapped persons can only be carried out by protecting
equally those people with actual handicaps as determined by a consid-
eration of objective criteria and those people perceived to be
handicapped.
Whether cancer will ever be a protected handicap in Illinois re-
mains an open question. Since the Illinois Human Rights Act includes
"perception" and a "characteristic . . which may result from disease"
as a means of identifying handicaps, the chances, hopefully, are greater
that cancer may be found to be a protected handicap in the future in
Illinois.
128. 67 I11. App. 3d 512, 516, 385 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1978).
